The Fifth International Students' Olympiad in Cryptography -- NSUCRYPTO:
  problems and their solutions by Gorodilova, Anastasiya et al.
The Fifth International Students’ Olympiad in
Cryptography — NSUCRYPTO:
problems and their solutions∗
A. Gorodilova1,2, S. Agievich3, C. Carlet4, X. Hou5, V. Idrisova1,2,
N. Kolomeec1,2, A. Kutsenko1, L. Mariot6 A. Oblaukhov1,2, S. Picek7,
B. Preneel8, R. Rosie9, N. Tokareva1,2
1Novosibirsk State University, Novosibirsk, Russia
2Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia
3Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus
4University of Paris 8, Paris, France
5University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620, United States of America
6 DISCo, Universit‘a degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Viale Sarca 336/14, 20126 Milano, Italy
7Cyber Security Research Group, Delft University of Technology, Mekelweg 2, Delft, The Netherlands
8ESAT-COSIC, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
9 University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
E-mail: nsucrypto@nsu.ru
Abstract. Problems and their solutions of the Fifth International Students’ Olympiad in cryp-
tography NSUCRYPTO’2018 are presented. We consider problems related to attacks on ciphers
and hash functions, Boolean functions, quantum circuits, Enigma, etc. We discuss several open
problems on orthogonal arrays, Sylvester matrices and disjunct matrices. The problem of existing
an invertible Sylvester matrix whose inverse is again a Sylvester matrix was completely solved
during the Olympiad.
Keywords. cryptography, ciphers, hash functions, Enigma, quantum circuits, metrically regular
sets, irreducible polynomials, orthogonal arrays, Sylvester matrices, disjunct matrices, Olympiad,
NSUCRYPTO.
∗The paper was supported by the Russian Ministry of Science and Education (the 5-100 Excellence Programme
and the Project no. 1.13559.2019/13.1), by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (projects no. 18-07-01394,
18-31-00479, 18-31-00374), by the program of fundamental scientific researches of the SB RAS no. I.5.1, project
no. 0314-2019-0017.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
04
48
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 J
un
 20
19
Introduction
NSUCRYPTO — The International Students’ Olympiad in cryptography — celebrated its 5-year
anniversary in 2018. The geography of the Olympiad is significant: there were more than 1600
participants from 52 countries in the first five Olympiads from 2014 to 2018! The Olympiad
program committee includes specialists from Belgium, France, The Netherlands, USA, Norway,
India, Belarus’, Russia.
Let us shortly formulate the format of the Olympiad. One of the Olympiad main ideas is
that everyone can participate: school students, university students and professionals! Each par-
ticipant chooses his/her category when registering on the Olympiad website nsucrypto.nsu.ru.
The Olympiad consists of two independent Internet rounds: the first one is individual while the
second round is team. The first round is divided into two sections: A — for school students, B —
for university students and professionals. Participants read the Olympiad problems and send their
solutions using the Olympiad website. The language of the Olympiad is English.
The Olympiad participants are always interested in solving different problems of various com-
plexity at the intersection of mathematics and cryptography. They show their knowledge, creativity
and professionalism. That is why the Olympiad not only includes interesting tasks with known so-
lutions but also offers unsolved problems in this area. This year, one of such open problems,
“Sylvester matrices”, was completely solved by three teams! All the open problems stated during
the Olympiad history can be found at nsucrypto.nsu.ru/unsolved-problems. On the website
we also mark the current status of each problem. For example, as well as “Sylvester matrices” was
solved in 2018, the problem “Algebraic immunity” was completely solved during the Olympiad in
2016. And what is important for us, some participants are trying to find solutions after Olympians.
For example, a partial solution for the problem “A secret sharing” (2014) was proposed in [7]. We
invite everybody who has ideas how to solve the problems to send your solutions to us!
The paper is organized as follows. We start with problem structure of the Olympiad in section 1.
Then we present formulations of all the problems stated during the Olympiad and give their detailed
solutions (section 2). Finally, we publish the lists of NSUCRYPTO’2018 winners in section 3.
Mathematical problems of the previous International Olympiads NSUCRYPTO’2014, NSU-
CRYPTO’2015, NSUCRYPTO’2016, and NSUCRYPTO’2017 can be found in [2], [1], [11], and [8]
respectively.
1 Problem structure of the Olympiad
There were 16 problems stated during the Olympiad, some of them were included in both rounds
(Tables 1, 2). The school section of the first round consisted of six problems, whereas the student
section contained seven problems. Three problems were common for both sections. The second
round was composed of eleven problems; they were common for all the participants. Three problems
of the second round were marked as unsolved (awarded special prizes from the Program Committee).
2 Problems and their solutions
In this section we formulate all the problems of NSUCRYPTO’2018 and present their detailed
solutions with paying attention to solutions proposed by the participants.
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Table 1: Problems of the first round
N Problem title Maximum scores
1 A digital signature 4
2 Jack and the Beanstalk 4
3 Key matrices 4
4 A sequence 4
5 Solutions of the equation 4
6 Stickers 6
N Problem title Maximum scores
1 Stickers 6
2 Key matrices 4
3 A sequence 4
4 Quantum circuits 4
5 Bash-S3 8
6 Metrical cryptosystem — 2 6
7 A fixed element 10
A — school section B — student section
Table 2: Problems of the second round
N Problem title Maximum scores
1 A digital signature 4
2 Orthogonal arrays Unsolved
3 Hash function FNV-1a 8
4 TwinPeaks2 6
5 An Enigmatic Challenge 8
6 Sylvester matrices Unsolved
7 Stickers 6
8 Bash-S3 8
9 Metrical cryptosystem — 2 6
10 A fixed element 10
11 Disjunct Matrices Unsolved
2.1 Problem “A digital signature”
2.1.1 Formulation
Alice uses a new digital signature algorithm, that turns a text message M into a pair (M, s), where s
is an integer and generated in the following way:
1. The special function h transforms M into a big positive integer r = h(M).
2. The number t = r2 is calculated, where t = t1t2 . . . tn.
3. The signature s is calculated as s = t1 + t2 + . . .+ tn.
Bob obtained the signed message
(Congratulations on the fifth year anniversary of NSUCRYPTO!, 2018)
from Alice and immediately recognized that something was wrong with the signature! How did he
discover it?
Remarks. By t = t1t2 . . . tn we mean that t1, t2, . . . , tn are decimal digits and all digits over
the bar form decimal number t.
2.1.2 Solution
It is widely known that every integer is congruent to the sum of its digits modulo 3. So, we have
that t ≡3 2018 ≡3 2. But t is equal to r2 and a square can not be equal to 2 modulo 3. Thus, we
have a contradiction.
We got a lot correct solutions. The most accurate and detailed solutions were sent by Ruxandra
Icleanu (Tudor Vianu National College of Computer Science, Romania), by Petr Ionov (Yaroslavl
State University, Russia), by Henning Seidler and Katja Stumpp (TU Berlin, Germany).
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2.2 Problem “Jack and the Beanstalk”
2.2.1 Formulation
Little Jack is only 7 years old and likes solving riddles involving the powers of 2. Recently, his uncle
Bitoshi gave him sixteen BeanCoin seeds and promised that Jack can collect all BeanCoins which
will grow from these seeds. But in order for BeanCoins to grow big and fruitful, Jack must plant
the seeds in the garden in a special way. He have to draw eight lines on the ground and plant all
sixteen seeds on these lines in such a way that each of the lines contains exactly four seeds.
Can you help Jack to achieve his goal and suggest how to plant the seeds?
2.2.2 Solution
The seeds can be place on the corners and intersection points of an
Figure 1: Octagram
octagram, as depicted in Figure 1. Please note that the main requirement
was to show that no other line contained exactly four seeds.
Many school students found interesting solutions how to draw these
lines. The most interesting ones were given by Gorazd Dimitrov (Yahya
Kemal College, Macedonia), Artem Ismagilov (The Specialized Educational
and Scientific Center UrFU, Russia) and Igor Pastushenko (The Specialized
Educational Scientific Center of Novosibirsk State University, Russia).
2.3 Problem “Key matrices”
2.3.1 Formulation
Let n be an odd positive integer. In some cipher, a key is a binary n× n matrix
A =

a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,n
a2,1 a2,2 . . . a2,n
...
...
. . .
...
an,1 an,2 . . . an,n
 ,
where ai,j is either 0 or 1, such that each diagonal of any length 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, n contains an odd
number of 1s.
What is the minimal and the maximal number of 1s that can be placed in a key matrix A?
Remarks. For example, for n = 3, diagonals are the following six lines:
2.3.2 Solution
The correct solution of this problem must consist of two steps. The first step is to find theoretical
lower and upper bounds for the number of 1s, and the second step is to prove that these bounds
are tight. The best solution was proposed by Aleksei Udovenko (University of Luxembourg), we
provide it below.
1. Minimum. Consider the n × n matrix A (n is odd) with both the top row filled with 1s,
the bottom row filled with 1s and the central cell equal to 1; all other elements are 0:
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
a1,i = 1, 1 6 i 6 n;
an,i = 1, 1 6 i 6 n;
a(n+1)/2,(n+1)/2 = 1;
ai,j = 0, otherwise.
Any diagonal of length less than n − 1 includes exactly single 1 (either from the top row or
from the bottom row). The two diagonals of length n include three 1s (one from the top row, one
from the bottom row and one from the center). Therefore, this matrix satisfies the condition. It
has 2n+ 1 ones.
We now prove that this number of ones is minimal. Note that the corner cells a1,1, a1,n,
an,1, an,n make a single element diagonals. Therefore, these cells must contain 1s. There are
2(n − 2) diagonals going in the down-right direction and not touching the corners (starting from
the cells of the leftmost column and from the cells for the topmost row). Furthermore, the main
diagonal without the corner cells must have odd number of ones too. Therefore, 2n − 3 disjoint
diagonals must contain at least one 1, in addition to 4 corner 1s. Therefore, there should be at
least 2(n− 2) + 1 + 4 = 2n+ 1 ones in the matrix.
2. Maximum. Consider the n×n matrix A (n is odd) filled with 1s except cells in the leftmost
and the rightmost columns which have an even row index:
a2i,1 = 0, 1 6 i 6 (n− 1)/2;
a2i,n = 0, 1 6 i 6 (n− 1)/2;
ai,j = 1, otherwise.
It is easy to check that all diagonals that contain an even number of elements contain a single
zero either from the leftmost or from the rightmost column. Therefore, these diagonals have an
odd number of 1s. Also, all diagonals that contain an odd number of elements contain no zeroes
and thus have an odd number of 1s too. Therefore, this matrix satisfies the condition. It has
n2 − 2(n− 1)/2 = n2 − n+ 1 ones.
We now prove that this number is maximal. Consider diagonals going in the down-right direction
that have an even number of elements. There are 2(n − 1)/2 = (n − 1) such diagonals and they
are disjoint. Each of them must contain at least a single zero. Therefore, the maximum number of
ones is n2 − n+ 1.
2.4 Problem “A sequence”
2.4.1 Formulation
Two friends, Roman and Anton, are very interested in sequences and ciphers. Their new cryp-
tosystem encrypts binary messages of length n, X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where each xi is either 0 or 1.
A key K of the cipher is a set of n integers a1, a2, . . . , an. The ciphertext Y for the message X
encrypted with the key K is the integer
Y = x1 · a1 + x2 · a2 + . . .+ xn · an.
Roman and Anton change their key regularly. Today, the key K is defined by
ai = 2
i + (−1)i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The friends can easily decipher any message using the key defined by this sequence for any n!
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1. Prove that the encryption is correct for this key K for any n: there are no two distinct input
messages X1 and X2 such that their ciphertexts Y 1 and Y 2 are equal, i. e. Y 1 = Y 2.
2. Describe an algorithm which can be used to easily decipher any ciphertext Y encrypted with
today’s key K. Here “easily” means that the algorithm should work much faster than checking
all possible variants for an input message X.
2.4.2 Solution
Let us firstly show that the sequence {ai} is superincreasing, i. e. ai+1 >
∑i
k=1 ak for any i > 0.
Indeed,
i∑
k=1
ak =
i∑
k=1
(2k + (−1)k) = 2i+1− 2 +
i∑
k=1
(−1)k =
{
2i+1 − 2, if i is even
2i+1 − 3, if i is odd < 2
i+1 + (−1)i = ai+1.
1. Let us show that the encryption is correct. Let X1 = (x11, . . . , x
1
n) and X
2 = (x21, . . . , x
2
n)
be two distinct messages, and i is the largest position such that x1i 6= x2i . Without loss of
generality, suppose that x1i = 1. Then
Y 1 − Y 2 = (x11 · a1 + . . .+ x1i · ai + . . .+ x1n · an)− (x21 · a1 + . . .+ x2i · ai + . . .+ x2n · an)
= (x11 − x21) · a1 + . . .+ (x1i−1 − x2i−1) · ai−1 + ai > 0
since {ai} is a superincreasing sequence.
2. The correctness of the decryption algorithm (Algorithm 1) is also based on the superincreasing
property of {ai}. The complexity of the algorithm consists of n integer comparisons.
Algorithm 1 The decryption algorithm
Input: Y , n.
Output: X = (x1, . . . , xn).
Step 0. T := Y , i := n.
Step 1. If T > ai, then xi = 1; else xi = 0.
Step 2. T := T − xi · ai, i := i− 1. If i > 0, go to step 1; else return X.
The problem was solved by the majority of participants including eight school students.
2.5 Problem “Solutions of the equation”
2.5.1 Formulation
Alice is studying special functions that are used in symmetric ciphers. Let En be the set of all
binary vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of length n, where xi is either 0 or 1. Given two vectors x and
y from En consider their sum x⊕ y = (x1 ⊕ y1, . . . , xn ⊕ yn), where ⊕ is addition modulo 2.
Example. If n = 3, then E3 = {(000), (001), (010), (011), (100), (101), (110), (111)}. Let x =
(010) and y = (011), then vector x⊕ y is equal to (010)⊕ (011) = (0⊕ 0, 1⊕ 1, 0⊕ 1) = (001).
We will say that a function F maps En to En if it transforms any vector x from En into some
vector F (x) from En.
Example. Let n = 2. For instance, we can define F that maps E2 to E2 as follows: F (00) =
(00), F (01) = (10), F (10) = (11) and F (11) = (10).
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Alice found a function S that maps E6 to E6 in such a way that the vectors S(x) and S(y) are
not equal for any nonequal vectors x and y. Also, S has another curious property: the equation
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a) = b
has either 0 or 2 solutions for any nonzero vector a from E6 and any vector b from E6.
Find the number of pairs (a, b) such that this equation has exactly 2 solutions!
2.5.2 Solution
Consider a function S that satisfies the conditions of the problem. Let us fix an abirtrary value a
that is nonzero. Consider the set of all possible values of S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a):
Ba = {S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a) | x ∈ E6} = 25, since S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a) = S(x⊕ a)⊕ S(x⊕ a⊕ a). Then
for every nonzero a there exist 25 values of b, such that S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a) = b has 2 solutions. Then
the number of pairs is equal to 63 ∗ 32 = 2016.
Correct answers were sent by only three school students: Alexey Lvov (Gymnasium 6 of Novosi-
birsk, Russia), Borislav Kirilov (The First Private Mathematical Gymnasium of Sofia, Bulgaria)
and Razvan Andrei Draghici (National College Fratii Buzesti, Romania).
2.6 Problem “Quantum circuits”
2.6.1 Formulation
Alice and Bob are interested in quantum circuits. They studied quantum operations and would
like to use them for their simple cipher. Let an input plaintext be P = (p1, p2, . . . , p16) ∈ F162 . The
ciphertext C ∈ F162 is calculated as
C = K ⊕ (F (p1, . . . , p4), F (p5, . . . , p8), F (p9, . . . , p12), F (p13, . . . , p16)),
where K ∈ F162 is a secret key and F is a function from F42 to F42; ⊕ is bitwise XOR.
The friends found a representation of F from wires and elementary quantum gates which form
a quantum circuit. They use Dirac notation and denote computational basis states by |0〉 and |1〉.
Further, quantum bits (qubits) are considered only in quantum states |0〉 and |1〉. Alice and Bob
used the following quantum gates and circuit symbols which are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Quantum gates and circuit symbols
Pauli-X gate |x〉 X |x⊕ 1〉 acts on a single qubit in the state |x〉, x ∈ {0, 1}.
controlled-NOT
gate (CNOT gate)
|x〉 • |x〉
|y〉 |y ⊕ x〉
acts on two qubits in the states |x〉 , |y〉, x, y ∈ {0, 1};
it flips the second qubit if and only if the first qubit is
in the state |1〉.
Toffoli gate
(CCNOT gate)
|x〉 • |x〉
|y〉 • |y〉
|z〉 |z ⊕ (x ∧ y)〉
acts on three qubits in the states |x〉 , |y〉 , |z〉, x, y, z ∈
{0, 1};
it flips the third qubit if and only if the states of the
first and the second qubits are both equal to |1〉.
|x〉 x a measurement of a qubit in the state |x〉, x ∈ {0, 1}, in the computational basis
{|0〉,|1〉}.
a wire carrying a single qubit (time goes left to right).
a wire carrying a single classical bit.
A quantum circuit which describes action of F on x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ F42, where F =
(f1, f2, f3, f4) and fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are Boolean functions in 4 variables, is the following:
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|x1〉 • • X • • • f1(x)
|x2〉 • • • X • • f2(x)
|x3〉 • • • • X • f3(x)
|x4〉 X • • • X f4(x)
The problem. The friends encrypted the plaintext P = (0011010111110010) and got the
ciphertext C = (1001101010010010). Find the secret key K!
2.6.2 Solution
One can notice that the given circuit can be simplified by observing that the following evolutions
|x1〉 • • X • • • f1(x)
|x2〉 • • • X • • f2(x)
|x3〉 • • • • X • f3(x)
|x4〉 X • • • X f4(x)
actually swap two states |x〉 , |y〉, x, y ∈ {0, 1}:
|x〉 • • |y〉
|y〉 • |x〉
|x〉 • |y〉
|y〉 • • |x〉
Both of the evolutions
|x1〉 • • X • • • f1(x)
|x2〉 • • • X • • f2(x)
|x3〉 • • • • X • f3(x)
|x4〉 X • • • X f4(x)
have form
|x〉 X • |x⊕ y ⊕ 1〉
|y〉 • X |x〉
for |x〉 , |y〉, x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
The algebraic normal forms of coordinate Boolean functions of F are
f1(x) = x1 ⊕ x2x3,
f2(x) = x2 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x2x3x4 ⊕ 1,
f3(x) = x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x1x3,
f4(x) = x4 ⊕ 1,
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where x ∈ F42. Then
K1,...,4 = C1,...,4 ⊕ F (p1, . . . , p4) = C1,...,4 ⊕ (0100) = (1101),
K5,...,8 = C5,...,8 ⊕ F (p5, . . . , p8) = C5,...,8 ⊕ (0010) = (1000),
K9,...,12 = C9,...,12 ⊕ F (p9, . . . , p12) = C9,...,12 ⊕ (0000) = (1001),
K13,...,16 = C13,...,16 ⊕ F (p13, . . . , p16) = C13,...,16 ⊕ (0111) = (0101),
and finally, the key is the following:
K = (1101100010010101).
Many participants coped with this problem and correctly found the key.
2.7 Problem “Stickers”
2.7.1 Formulation
Bob always takes into account all the recommendations of security experts. He switched from short
passwords to long passphrases and changes them every month. Bob usually chooses passphrases
from the books he is reading. Passphrases are so lengthy and are changed so often! In order to
not forget them, Bob decided to use stickers with hints. He places them on his monitors (ooh,
experts...). The only hope is that Bob’s hint system is reliable because it uses encryption. But is
that true? Could you recover Bob’s current passphrase from the photo of his workspace (Figure 2)?
Figure 2: Workspace
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2.7.2 Solution
At the picture we see three stickers. One of them is “A Discourse of Fire and Salt” that
represents a title of a book written by Blaise de Vigene`re. This is the first hint that probably the
Vigine`re cipher was used. Then we have a sticker with the ciphertext AJKTUWLWLZYABQYRSLS that
consists of 19 letters. And finally, we see the sticker with arrows, where we can find 19 angles that
probably correspond to the ciphertext letters.
There is a keyboard at the picture. So, we can
Figure 3: Keyboard rows
guess that these arrows could be related to the let-
ters from the keyboard. Let us look at the first
two keyboard rows (Figure 3). We can recover the
secrete key ESWAQRDFTGYHIJUKOLP. By deciphering
the ciphertext using this key and the Vigine`re ci-
pher, we get WROTEFIRSTATTHEHEAD. Thus, Bob’s
current passphrase is “Wrote first at the head”.
Surprisingly, nobody solved this problem in the
first round, while five teams coped with it in the second round.
2.8 Problem “Bash-S3”
2.8.1 Formulation
The sponge function Bash-f [3] uses the permutation S3 that transforms a triple of 64-bit binary
words a, b, c in the following way:
S3(a, b, c) = (b ∨ ¬c⊕ a, a ∨ c⊕ b, a ∧ b⊕ c).
Here ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊕ denote the binary bitwise operations “NOT’, “AND”, “OR”, “XOR” respectively.
The operations are listed in descending order of priority. Let wk also denote the cyclic shift of a
64-bit word w to the left by k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 63} positions.
Alice wants to strengthen S3. She can add by XOR any input a, b, c or its cyclic shift to any
output. She must use at least one cyclic shift and she cannot add two identical terms to the same
output.
Help Alice to change S3 in such a way that a modified S3 will be still a permutation!
Remarks. 1. For example, in the expression b ∨ ¬c⊕ a, we firstly calculate ¬c, then calculate
b ∨ ¬c, and after that the final result (according to descending order of operations priority).
2. The modification
(b ∨ ¬c⊕ a⊕ a11, a ∨ c⊕ a7 ⊕ c, a ∧ b⊕ b32)
is allowed but it does not satisfy the permutation condition.
2.8.2 Solution
It is allowed to add to the outputs of S3 the outputs of the following linear transformation:
L(a, b, c) = (L0(a, b, c), L1(a, b, c), L2(a, b, c))
that is defined by bitwise XOR operations and cyclic shifts.
The permutation property of a modified S3 will be broken if for some distinct (a, b, c) and (a′, b′, c′)
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S3(a, b, c)⊕ S3(a′, b′, c′) = L(a, b, c)⊕ L(a′, b′, c′). (1)
We will call the expressions from both sides of equality (1) and the sum (a, b, c)⊕ (a′, b′, c′) by
differences. Let
(w0, w1, w2) = (a, b, c)⊕ (a′, b′, c′),
(W0,W1,W2) = S3(a, b, c)⊕ S3(a′, b′, c′).
On the one hand, input and output differences of S3 satisfy (for instance, see [3]) the equality
w0 ∧W0 ⊕ w1 ∧W1 ⊕ w2 ∧W2 = 11 . . . 1.
On the other hand, by (1) the permutation property of a modified S3 will be broken if
(W0,W1,W2) = L(a, b, c)⊕ L(a′, b′, c′) = L(w0, w1, w2).
As a result, a modified S3 will be still a permutation if the following equality
w0 ∧ L0(w0, w1, w2)⊕ w1 ∧ L1(w0, w1, w2)⊕ w2 ∧ L2(w0, w1, w2) = 11 . . . 1 (2)
does not hold for any nonzero (w0, w1, w2). For example, if
L(a, b, c) = (a⊕ ad ⊕ b, a⊕ c, b), d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 63},
then (2) becomes
w0 ∧ (w0 ⊕ wd0 ⊕ w1)⊕ w1 ∧ (w0 ⊕ w2)⊕ w2 ∧ (w1) = w0 ∧ (w0 ⊕ wd0) 6= 11 . . . 1.
Thus, we found the following solution for the problem:
S3(a, b, c)⊕ L(a, b, c) = (b ∨ ¬c⊕ ad ⊕ b, a ∨ c⊕ a⊕ b⊕ c, a ∧ b⊕ b⊕ c).
Note that there are many other possible solutions.
This problem was completely solved by three participants in the first round and by nine teams
in the second round. Many of these solutions were interesting and compact.
2.9 Problem “Metrical cryptosystem – 2”
2.9.1 Formulation
Let Fn2 be an n-dimensional vector space over the field F2 = {0, 1}. Alice and Bob exchange
messages using the following cryptosystem.
1. First, they use a supercomputer to calculate two special large secret sets A,B ⊆ Fn2 which
have the following property: there exists a constant ` (` > 26), such that for any x ∈ Fn2 it
holds
d(x,A) + d(x,B) = `,
where d(x,A) denotes Hamming distance from the vector x to the set A.
2. Alice then saves the number `, the set A and a set of vectors a1, a2, . . . , ar such that for any
k : 0 6 k 6 `, there is a vector ai at distance k from A. Similarly, Bob saves the number `,
the set B and a set of vectors b1, b2, . . . , bs such that for any k : 0 6 k 6 `, there is a vector
bi at distance k from B.
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3. Text messages are encrypted letter by letter. In order to encrypt a letter Alice replaces it
with its number in the alphabet, say k. Then she chooses some vector ai at distance k from
the set A and sends this vector over to Bob. Bob then calculates the distance d(ai, B) and
using the property of the sets A,B, calculates k = ` − d(ai, B). So, he gets the letter Alice
sent. If Bob wants to send an encrypted message to Alice, he does the same but using his
saved vectors and the set B.
Eve was able to hack the supercomputer when it was calculating the sets A and B. She extracted
the set C from its memory, which consists of all vectors of Fn2 that are at distance 1 or less from
either A or B. She also learned that ` is even.
Help Eve to crack the presented cryptosystem (to decrypt any short intercepted message)! You
know that she has an (illegal) access to the supercomputer, which can calculate and output the list
of distances from all vectors of Fn2 to any input set D in reasonable (but not negligible) time.
Remarks. Recall several definitions and notions. The Hamming distance d(x, y) between
vectors x and y is the number of coordinates in which these vectors differ. Distance from vector
y ∈ Fn2 to the set X ⊆ Fn2 is defined as d(y,X) = minx∈X d(y, x).
2.9.2 Solution
Let us denote by Ai (Bi respectively) the set of all vectors at distance i from the set A (B respec-
tively):
Ai = {x ∈ Fn2 : d(x,A) = i}, Bi = {x ∈ Fn2 : d(x,B) = i}.
It is easy to see that
• A = A0 = B`,
• B = B0 = A`,
• Ai = B`−i for any i ∈ {0, . . . , `},
• C = A1 ∪B1.
From the definition of the Hamming distance it is easy to prove that if a vector x lies in the set
Ai, then it is at distance |i− j| from the set Aj for any i, j.
Proof. Indeed, if i = j, the statement is trivial.
Assume that i > j. By definition, d(x,A) = i, so there exists a shortest path of length i from A
to x, consisting of vectors x0, x1, . . . , xi = x, where x0 ∈ A. Since consecutive vectors in the path
differ in only one coordinate, and vectors from As and At can be neighbours only if |s − t| 6 1,
it follows that xk ∈ Ak for every k = 0, . . . , i. So, vector xj from the path belongs to Aj and is
at distance i − j from vector x. Therefore, d(x,Aj) 6 i − j. Distance cannot be less than i − j,
because then d(x,A) would have been less that i, which contradicts conditions of the statement.
Thus, d(x,Aj) = i− j.
If i < j, then we can replace Ai with B`−i, Aj with B`−j and use B instead of A for the same
argument as in the previous case.
In particular, given x is in Ai, it is at distance |i−1| from the set A1 and at distance |i− (`−1)|
from the set B1.
Let us “feed” the set C to the supercomputer. We denote the maximal distance from vectors of
Fn2 to vectors of C as r, and the set of all vectors achieving this distance as Ĉ. Taking into account
the statement proven above (and the fact that ` is even), we can see that the maximum is achieved
for vectors of the set A `
2
. Hence, r = `2 − 1 and Ĉ = A `
2
. Thus, we can calculate ` as 2r + 2.
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Assume now that Alice sends a message ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aik to Bob. Eve intercepts it and (using the
obtained table of distances from the set C) calculates that these vectors are at distances s1, s2, . . . , sk
from the set C. Therefore, they are at distances s1 + 1, s2 + 1, . . . , sk + 1 from the set A∪B. Since
d(x,A ∪B) = min(d(x,A), d(x,B)), each encrypted letter could be either si + 1 or `− (si + 1). If
one of these two numbers is greater than 26, we can easily determine the encrypted letter, if not,
we can consider both possibilities. In the worst case we would need to consider 2N variants, where
N is the length of the message, but since messages are short and are written in natural language,
we do not need to check all of them and the decryption should not be hard.
Note: Sets A and B satisfying condition from Step 1 of the problem (for an arbitrary constant `
not necessarily greater than 26) are called strongly metrically regular and are studied in [9].
Best solutions to the problem were submitted by Alexey Chilikov (Bauman Moscow State
Technical University, Russia) and Saveliy Skresanov (Novosibirsk State University, Russia).
2.10 Problem “A fixed element”
2.10.1 Formulation
A polynomial f(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ F2[X1, . . . , Xn] is called reduced if the degree of each Xi in f is at
most 1. For 0 6 r 6 n, the rth order Reed — Muller code of length 2n, denoted by R(r, n), is
the F2-space of all reduced polynomials in X1, . . . , Xn of total degree less or equal than r. We also
define R(−1, n) = {0}.
The general linear group GL(n,F2) acts on R(r, n) naturally: Given A ∈ GL(n,F2) and
f(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ R(r, n), Af is defined to be the reduced polynomial obtained from f((X1, . . . , Xn)A)
by replacing each power Xki (k > 2) with Xi. Consequently, GL(n,F2) acts on the quotient space
R(r, n)/R(r − 1, n).
Let A ∈ GL(n,F2) be such that its characteristic polynomial is a primitive irreducible polyno-
mial over F2. Prove that the only element in R(r, n)/R(r − 1, n), where 0 < r < n, fixed by the
action of A is 0.
2.10.2 Solution
Let
({1,...,n}
r
)
denote the set of r-subsets of {1, . . . , n}. When A acts on R(r, n)/R(r − 1, n), its
matrix with respect to the basis
∏
i∈I Xi, I ∈
({1,...,n}
r
)
, is the rth compound matrix Cr(A) of A.
The eigenvalues of A are γ2
i
, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, where γ is a primitive element of F2n . The eigenvalues
of Cr(A) are all possible products of r eigenvalues of A, i.e.,
γ
∑
i∈I 2
i
, I ∈
({0, . . . , n− 1}
r
)
.
Clearly, the above expression never equals 1. Hence 1 is not an eigenvalue of Cr(A). Therefore, the
action of A does not fix any nonzero element in R(r, n)/(r − 1, n).
The problem was solved by four teams in the second round: Aleksei Udovenko (University
of Luxembourg), Dianthe Bose and Neha Rino (Chennai Mathematical Institute, India), Andrey
Kalachev, Danil Cherepanov, and Alexey Radaev (Bauman Moscow State Technical University,
Russia), Sergey Titov and Kristina Geut (Ural State University of Railway Transport, Russia).
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2.11 Problem “Hash function FNV-1a”
2.11.1 Formulation
Hash function FNV-1a [13] processes a message x composed of bytes x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}
in the following way:
1. h← h0;
2. for i = 1, 2, . . . , n: h← (h⊕ xi)g mod 2128;
3. return h.
Here h0 = 144066263297769815596495629667062367629, g = 2
88 + 315. The expression h ⊕ xi
means that the least significant byte of h is added bitwise modulo 2 with the byte xi.
Find a collision, that is, two different messages x and x′ such that FNV-1a(x) = FNV-1a(x′).
Collisions on short messages and collisions that are obtained without intensive calculations are
welcomed. Supply your answer as a pair of two hexadecimal strings which encode bytes of colliding
messages.
2.11.2 Solution
We will base on the solution for the problem “FNV2” (NSUCRYPTO’2017) [8], where it was required
to find a collision for the similar hash function FNV2. FNV-1a differs from FNV2 in the following:
instead of the ⊕ operation for adding h and xi it uses standard + operation.
It is easy to see that
FNV2(x1x2 . . . xn) = (h0g
n + x1g
n + x2g
n−1 + . . .+ xng) mod 2128.
For FNV2, we found a relation
a1g
n−1 + a2gn−2 + . . .+ an ≡ 0 (mod 2128),
where ai ∈ {−255, . . . , 255}.
Then we represented ai as the difference xi − x′i and found a collision
FNV2(x1x2 . . . xn)− FNV2(x′1x′2 . . . x′n) = a1gn + a2gn−1 + . . .+ ang ≡ 0 (mod 2128).
Let us call a representation ai = xi−x′i as a splitting of ai. There can be several splittings for a
given ai. Each of them induces two trajectories of intermediate values of h: the trajectory starting
with a message x1x2 . . . xn and the trajectory starting with a message x
′
1x
′
2 . . . x
′
n.
Let hi and h
′
i be the low bytes of h for the first and second trajectories respectively before the
additions h+ xi and h+ x
′
i. Let us call a splitting suitable if
hi + xi < 256, h
′
i + x
′
i < 256, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let us evaluate the probability of existing a suitable splitting for ai. We will assume that hi,
h′i are realizations of independent random variables with uniform distribution over {0, 1, . . . , 255}.
Bytes xi and x
′
i can take any value from intervals {0, . . . , 255 − hi} and {0, . . . , 255 − h′i}
respectively. At the same time, the difference xi − x′i takes value from the interval {−255 +
h′i, . . . , 255− hi}.
Then ai is in the interval {−255 + h′i, . . . , 255− hi} with the probability
Pr (−255 + h′i 6 ai 6 255− hi) =
{
Pr (hi 6 255− ai), ai > 0,
Pr (h′i 6 255− |ai|), ai < 0,
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that is equal to 1− |ai|/256.
Thus, the probability of existing a suitable splitting for the whole sequence a1a2 . . . an is the
following:
p =
n∏
i=1
(
1− |ai|
256
)
.
This probability can be rather high. For example, p ≈ 1/25 for the following sequence for n = 18:
(−64, 5, 73, 35,−53, 19,−10,−78,−44, 48, 61,−1,−80, 26,−22, 72,−31, 0).
Or, p ≈ 1/13 for the following sequence for n = 19:
(−37, 34,−74,−4,−17, 33,−18, 21, 54, 33,−1, 58,−71,−13,−10, 11,−88,−19, 0).
Moreover, the probability can be increased if we change a strategy of finding suitable splittings.
We can allow to modify splittings a1, . . . , ai−1 that have been already built if it is impossible to
find a splitting for ai.
After finding a suitable splitting, we determine the sequences (hi), (h
′
i). Then we determine the
bytes x˜i, x˜
′
i such that
hi ⊕ x˜i = hi + xi, h′i ⊕ x˜′i = h′i + x′i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
It is important that there are no carries in high bytes in additions hi + xi, h
′
i + x
′
i; and x˜i, x˜
′
i
can be always found. Then a collision for FNV-1a is a pair of messages x˜1x˜2 . . . x˜n and x˜
′
1x˜
′
2 . . . x˜
′
n.
It remains to say that the sequence (ai) can be found using LLL algorithm. The algorithm is
applied to the lattice defined by the basic vectors
b1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0, g
n−1 mod 2128),
b2 = (0, 1, . . . , 0, g
n−2 mod 2128),
. . .
bn = (0, 0, . . . , 1, g
0 mod 2128),
bn+1 = (0, 0, . . . , 0, t2
128),
where t is a small integer. LLL finds a short basis of the lattice, i. e. vectors
v =
n+1∑
i=1
aibi
with small coordinate values. Let the last coordinate v equal to 0. Then
n+1∑
i=1
aig
n−i ≡ 0 (mod 2128),
i. e. (a1, . . . , an) is a required solution.
This problem was completely solved by fourteen teams (the most of them used a reduction to
the problem FNV2). Some examples of collisions proposed by participants (in HEX format) are
given in Table 4.
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Table 4: Collisions of FNV-1a.
message 1 message 2
f1dd5921afd29cbd33b357184e8c 928ea41b7373792aae2bfa72ca64
eb18151b160aa95e0511357e158b58 ab775b3a7c7c7c7c7c7c3a5dc94e
f828e4070672220b195e0ddd2114a4c008 3638fa655d1b61e21419134803222bbb35
3a7a3a7a3a4a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a 51089c5e7fe7cc2d740b5f70b3cb5461824d
f4331cede51639057d05f80f1d6638b40b286f eb270505187332116c611402081f1155326013
07160c2e0b700b1338ef6e63360419060507 10610bf23b0573e2317106176a171c6a4c6e
00ca0000cb000000000000000029092100d814 2d000158001b773a6364fc0905000000e90000
2.12 Problem “TwinPeaks2”
2.12.1 Formulation
Bob realized that his last year cipher TwinPeaks (NSUCRYPTO’2017) [8] is not secure enough and
modified it. He considerably increased the number of rounds and made rounds more complicated.
New Bob’s cipher works as follows.
A message X is represented as a binary word of length 128. It is divided into four 32-bit words
a, b, c, d and then the following round transformation is applied 48 times:
(a, b, c, d)← (b, c, d, a⊕ S3(S1(b)⊕ S2(b ∧ ¬c⊕ c ∨ d)⊕ S1(d))),
Here S1, S2, S3 are secret permutations over 32-bit words; ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊕ are binary bitwise “NOT’,
“OR”, “AND”, “XOR” respectively (the operations are listed in descending order of priority). The
concatenation of the final a, b, c, d is the resulting ciphertext Y for the message X.
Agent Cooper again wants to read Bob’s messages! He caught the ciphertext
Y = DEB239852F1B47B005FB390120314478
and captured also Bob’s smartphone with the TwinPeaks2 implementation! Here it is [15]. Now
Cooper (and you too) can encrypt any messages with TwinPeaks2 but still can not decrypt any
one. Help Cooper to decrypt Y .
Remarks. The ciphertext is given in hexadecimal notation, the first byte is DE.
2.12.2 Solution
Let F be the round transformation of TwinPeaks2:
F (a, b, c, d) = (b, c, d, a⊕ f(b, c, d)).
The encryption transformation is the composition of 48 copies of F , i. e. it can be written as F 48.
Consequently, F−48 is the decryption transformation. Let
τ(a, b, c, d) = (d, c, b, a).
Let us note that f(b, c, d) = f(d, c, b). Then the composition of F , τ and F gives us τ :
F ◦ τ ◦ F (a, b, c, d) = F (a⊕ f(b, c, d), d, c, b) = F (a⊕ f(d, c, b), d, c, b) = (d, c, b, a).
Hence,
F 48τF 48 = τ
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or
F−48 = τF 48τ−1 = τF 48τ.
Thus, in order to decrypt Y one should write its 32-bit blocks in reverse order, encrypt the
result and then reverse the order of the blocks again. The result will be a hexadecimal word, which
gives us the desired message
attacksgetbetter.
The best solution to the problem has been submitted by Carl Lo¨ndahl (Sweden), which not
only provides a clean theoretical solution, but also proposes a slide attack on the cipher.
2.13 Problem “An Enigmatic Challenge”
2.13.1 Formulation
The Enigma machine is a symmetric cipher famous for
Figure 4: A simplified Enigma
being during the Second World War by the German military.
Its internal structure comprises an 26-letter Latin alphabetic
permutation, implemented as rotors. The machine used for
this problem consists of 3 rotors and a reflector.
Figure 4 shows how a simplified Enigma machine works.
The key components are the set of input switches (2) – which
are reduced to 4 in the example but could have been 26 for
the Latin alphabet – an input plugboard (3,7,8), three rotors
(5), the reflector (6) and the output board (9).
The components have the following functionality:
• Rotors: a rotor (5) is a wheel with the upper-case
alphabet in order on the rim and a hole for an axle. On
both sides of a rotor are 26 electrical contacts each under a
letter. Each contact on one side is wired to a contact on the
other side at a different position. The rotor implements an
one-to-one and onto function between the upper-case letters,
where each letter is mapped to a different one (an irreflexive
permutation).
• Reflector: the reflector (6) is positioned after the rotors and has contacts for each letter of
the alphabet on one side only. The letters are wired up in pairs, so that an input current on a
letter is reflected back to a different letter.
The input message: is permuted by the rotors, passes through the reflector and then goes back
through the rotors in the reverse order (as depicted in the figure). Finally, the light bulb indicates
the encrypted letter. The plugboard plays no role in permuting the letter for this challenge, although
it could have.
To prevent simple frequency analysis attack the right rotor rotates with every new input. After
the right rotor completed a full rotation (after 26 letters were encrypted), the middle rotor rotates
once. Similarly, after the middle rotor completes a full rotation (and the right rotor complete 676
rotations), the left rotor rotates once.
Challenge: you will play the role of an attacker that knows the source of the plaintext to be
encrypted. You are given a ciphertext corresponding to a plaintext taken from this known source
which happens to be “Moby Dick” by Herman Melville, and you are asked to recover the plaintext.
The plaintext consists only of trimmed capital letters with no punctuation marks and spaces and is
contiguous. All letters are from the Latin alphabet. Extra information on the settings of the rotors
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is provided: the configuration of the first rotor is very close to the one used in the 1930 commercial
version: EKMFLGDQVZNTOWYHXUSPAIBRCJ.
Ciphertext:
RHSM ZHXX AOWW ZTWQ QQMB CRZA BARN MLAV MLSX SPBA ZTHG
YLGE VGZG KULJ FLOZ RQAW YGAA DCJB YWBW IYQQ FAAO RAGK
BGSW OARG EYSP IKYE LLUO YCNH HDBV AFKD HETA ONNR HXHE
BBRT ROZD XJCC OMXR PNSW UAZB TNJY BANH FGCS GJWY YTBV
VGLX KUZW PARO NMXP LDLZ ICBK XVSJ NXCF SOTA AQYS YZFX
MZDH MSZI ABAH RFXT FTPU VWMC PEXQ NZVA LMFX BHKG QGYS
BIYE MEUE PJNR AVTL JSUZ PLHQ MOUI IQFD HVXI NOOJ YJAF
WAVU PVQA FMKP AHLK XJYD GITB QSPK CUZU XPRK MUJJ YRJ
Link to “Moby Dick” text file can be found in [14].
2.13.2 Solution
It is easy to observe that the Left and Middle Rotors will not change for each block of 26 characters
of the plaintext. From this point of view, we can regard the composition of permutations induced
by the Left and Middle rotors (as well as the reflector) as one, fixed permutation. After the next
26 letters are processed, the Middle rotor turns, and a distinct permutation is to be used for the
incoming block of 26 letters. Due to the fact the challenge ciphertext is less than 676 characters,
we do not bother with turning the Left rotor.
To fix some notations, let ρi, Li,Mi denote permutations defined on the set {A, . . . , Z}, with i
denoting each block of 26 letters to be processed. That is i ∈ {1, . . . , d |C|26 e}, where |C| denotes the
length of the ciphertext (its number of characters). We also write
pii = M
−1
i ◦ L−1i ◦ ρ ◦ Li ◦Mi, i ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌈ |C|
26
⌉}
.
The next step is to split the challenge ciphertext into blocks of 26 characters, and use the fact
that for each block i, pii acts as an oracle that returns the same value for the same input. We will
correlate this with the information that is apriori given on the first rotor. Although we do not
have its exact configuration, we use the fact that it is close to some known rotor that (in fact, the
real configuration permutes 4 elements and then applies a circular permutation of length four).
The permutation corresponding to the given Right rotor of the commercial Enigma (1930) is
the following:
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
E K M F L G D Q V Z N T O W Y H X U S P A I B R C J
Then we take the first block of 26 letters and obtain their inverses, minding the fact that the
rotor shifts with one place to the left after we read one letter. Hence, for the first block we obtain:
RHSM ZHXX AOWW ZTWQ QQMB CRZA BA
UVAH FOFL VRDQ TDNG DQLA BOIR JJ
Now we remark on a “distance-preserving” property: if the distance between identical characters
returned by pii (the input to the Right rotors) is `, then it maintained in the original plaintext.
As an example, the group ZHXX in the first block of ciphertext has been obtained for the group
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FOFL and we note a distance of 2 (F → O → F) between F and F. This means that an alphabetical
distance of 2 exists between the corresponding letters of the plaintext. More precisely, if:
pi1
(
R(x)
)
= pi1
(
R′(y)
)
,
where R′ is obtained by shifting R with ` elements, then the character y is at a distance of ` from
the character x (but in the opposite sense). Based on this observation, the solution is to identify
such pairs inside a block and record the distance between them. As 4 elements are permuted in
the real configuration of the rotor, false positives will appear.
After the colliding characters per block, say in position i and j, have been identified and their
distance recorded, say the distance is `, one will simply write a script that will pass through the
given plaintext (after removing the non-alphabetic characters) and identify the sequence (matching
the length of the ciphertext) where the distance between the characters in position i and j is `.
Finally, the plaintext that is to be recovered is:
ALREADY we are boldly launched upon the deep ; but
soon we shall be lost in its unshored, harbourless immen-
sities. Ere that come to pass ; ere the Pequod’a weedy
hull rolls side by side with the barnacled hulls of the
leviathan; at the outset it is but well to attend to a
matter almost indispensable to a thorough appreciative
understanding of the more special leviathanic revelations
and allusions of all sorts which are to follow.
Finally, eight teams completely solved the problem. Note, that there was a simple way how to
almost find a solution, which was used by many teams. It is based on the fact that no letter from
the plaintext gets mapped to the same letter in the ciphertext using Enigma. But this approach
gives two possible solutions and does not allow to prove that one of them is not correct.
2.14 Problem “Orthogonal arrays” (unsolved)
2.14.1 Formulation
Orthogonal arrays are closely connected with cryptographic Boolean functions. Namely, supports
of correlation immune functions give orthogonal arrays when their elements are written as the rows
of an array.
Given three positive integers n, t and λ such that t < n, we call t − (2, n, λ) orthogonal array
every λ2t × n binary array (i.e. matrix over the 2-element field) such that, in every subset of t
columns of the array, every (binary) t-tuple appears in exactly λ rows. t is called the strength of
this orthogonal array.
Find a 4− (2, 11, λ) orthogonal array with minimal value of λ.
2.14.2 Solution
The best known answer to this question is λ = 8 [10], but it is unknown whether there exists
a 4 − (2, 11, λ) orthogonal array for λ < 8. This open problem remains unsolved. There were
suggested several ideas by the participants.
The most interesting one was proposed by Aleksei Udovenko (University of Luxembourg). His
study starts with the Nordstrom — Robinson code (that is, the Kerdock code of length 16 and size
256, whose dual distance is the minimum distance of the Preparata code, that is 6, which gives
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a strength of the orthogonal array (OA) equal to 5). Only the codewords with the first element
equal to zero are kept and their coordinate at 0 is deleted, which makes size 128, length 15 and
strength 4. Then three columns are erased from the OA, which does not reduce the strength, and
the resulting OA provides a solution to the problem with λ = 8. It is then shown (by using known
results) that, for any solution to the problem, λ is a least 6. This is interesting. The solution
found is written in the form (x, F (x)) where F is a quadratic (7, 4)-function. Its determination
allows to determine the 4-th order correlation immune function whose support is this OA. This is
a 11-variable Boolean function of algebraic degree 5. Then the annihilators of this function are
studied. It is shown that the function has a linear annihilator (and has then algebraic immunity
1). After an observation on the impossibility of extending a solution which would have λ 6 7, the
Xiao — Massey characterization of OA is proved again in different terms. It is also shown that any
affine annihilator of a t-th order correlation immune function must be t-resilient which is a nice
observation. A computer search is made with Integer Linear Programming showing that any 4-th
order correlation immune function having an affine annihilator should have weight at least 128,
which is a nice observation. This nice work concludes with open questions.
Another one good solution was given by the team of Evgeniya Ishchukova, Vyacheslav Salmanov,
and Oksana Shamilyan (Southern Federal University, Russia). They firstly studied the maximum
value of n given t for small values of t. Then an algorithm was designed which reduces the search
to solutions presenting some symmetries observed in smaller values of t and n. Finally, a solution
was given with λ = 8 which is the coset of a linear code of length n = 11 and dimension k = 7
(and therefore 128 codewords), with dual distance 5 and the corresponding function is then indeed
4th order correlation immune giving a 4− (2, 11, λ) orthogonal array. Unfortunately, the question
whether 128 is minimal was not addressed.
2.15 Problem “Sylvester matrices” (unsolved)
2.15.1 Formulation
Sylvester matrices play a role in security since they are connected with topics like secret sharing
and MDS codes constructed with cellular automata.
Consider two univariate polynomials over a field, P1(x) of degree n and P2(x) of degree m, where
P1(x) = amx
m + . . .+a0 and P2(x) = bnx
n + . . .+ b0. The Sylvester matrix is an (m+n)× (m+n)
matrix formed by filling the matrix beginning with the upper left corner with the coefficients of
P1(x), then shifting down one row and one column to the right and filling in the coefficients starting
there until they hit the right side. The process is then repeated for the coefficients of P2(x). All
the other positions are filled with zero.
Prove whether there exist invertible Sylvester matrices whose inverse are Sylvester matrices as
well.
Example. For m = 4 and n = 3, the Sylvester matrix is the following:
a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 0 0
0 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 0
0 0 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0
b3 b2 b1 b0 0 0 0
0 b3 b2 b1 b0 0 0
0 0 b3 b2 b1 b0 0
0 0 0 b3 b2 b1 b0

19
2.15.2 Solution
We are pleased to say that three teams completely solved this problem! They are Alexey Chilikov
(Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Russia), Radu Caragea, Madalina Bolboceanu, and
Miruna Rosca (Bitdefender, Romania), Samuel Tang and Harry Lee (Hong Kong). Here we present
the main idea for the solution.
Let m 6 n. Let P1(x) = xm and P2(x) = xn + 1. Then their Sylvester matrix is the following:(
In 0n×m
Im 0m×(n−m) Im
)
,
where Ik denotes the k×k identity matrix; and 0k×` is the k× ` zero matrix. Taking all operations
over the the 2-element field, it is clear that(
In 0n×m
Im 0m×(n−m) Im
)
·
(
In 0n×m
Im 0m×(n−m) Im
)
=
(
In 0n×m
0m×n Im
)
= Im+n.
Thus, the considered Sylvester matrix is an involutory matrix. Therefore, its inverse is the Sylvester
matrix as well.
Let m > n. Assume that the inverse of the Sylvester matrix of P1(x) and P2(x) is also the
Sylvester matrix for two polynomials over the 2-element field, say Q1(x) = cpx
p+cp−1xp−1+· · ·+c0,
Q2(x) = dqx
q + dq−1xq−1 + · · · + d0, of degrees p > 0 and q > 0 respectively, which satisfy
p+q = m+n. The product of Sylvester matrices which correspond to P1(x), P2(x) and Q1(x), Q2(x)
is equal to Im+n, in particular
am am−1 . . . a0
am am−1 . . . a0
. . .
. . .
am am−1 . . . a0
bn bn−1 . . . b0 0 . . . 0
bn bn−1 . . . b0
. . .
. . .
bn bn−1 . . . b0

·

cp
0
...
0
dq
0
...
0

=

1
0
...
0
 ∈ Fm+n2 .
The condition q > n implies bncp = 0, but bn = cp = 1 since the polynomials P2(x) and Q1(x)
have degrees n and p respectively. Therefore, it must hold q 6 n. Since Q2(x) has degree q, then
dq = 1 and (1 + bn−q) = bn−q+1 = bn−q+2 = . . . = bn−q+min{q,m−1} = 0. From bn = 1 it follows that
min{q,m− 1} < q, that is m 6 q. Finally, we get m 6 q 6 n < m that is a contradiction.
Thus, in the case m 6 n there exist invertible Sylvester matrices whose inverse are Sylvester
matrices as well but for m > n it does not hold.
2.16 Problem “Disjunct Matrices” (unsolved)
2.16.1 Formulation
Disjunct Matrices are used in some key distribution protocols for traitor tracing. Disjunct Matrices
(DM) are a particular kind of binary matrices which have been especially applied to solve the
Non-Adaptive Group Testing (NAGT) problem, where the task is to detect any configuration of
t defectives out of a population of N items. Traditionally, the methods used to construct DM
leverage on error-correcting codes and other related algebraic techniques.
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Let A = (x>1 , x>2 , . . . , x>N ) be an M × N binary matrix. Then, A is called t-disjunct if, for all
subsets of t columns S = {xi1 , . . . , xit}, and for all remaining columns xj /∈ S, it holds that
supp(xj) 6⊆
t⋃
k=1
supp(xik),
where supp(x) denotes the set of coordinate positions of a binary vector x with 1s.
In other words, a matrix A is t-disjunct if for every subset S of t columns the support of any
other column is not contained in the union of the supports of the columns in S.
Prove what is the minimum number of rows in a 5-disjunct matrix.
2.16.2 Solution
We find ourselves obliged to inform that the formulation of the problem did not include the condition
which make this problem non-trivial. The condition is that the number of columns must be greater
than the number of rows. This formulation comprises practical significance and has following
equivalent form: given t, when does there exist a t-disjunct algorithm better than the trivial
one that tests each item individually? Please find details regarding Non-Adaptive Group Testing
(NAGT) problem together with known results and mentioned formulations in [12].
The solution of the initial problem is 6, an example is 6× 6 identity matrix, it was discovered
by several participants. However some participants (Alexey Chilikov from Bauman Moscow State
Technical University, Aleksei Udovenko from University of Luxembourg, Henning Seidler and Katja
Stumpp from Technical University of Berlin) obtained bounds for the number of rows depending
the parameter t and the number of columns.
3 Winners of the Olympiad
Here we list information about the winners of NSUCRYPTO’2018 in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Figure 5: Winners of NSUCRYPTO from 2014 to 2018
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Table 5: Winners of the first round in school section A (“School Student”)
Place Name Country, City School Scores
1 Borislav Kirilov Bulgaria, Sofia The First Private Mathematical Gymnasium 22
1 Alexey Lvov Russia, Novosibirsk Gymnasium 6 21
1 Razvan Andrei Draghici Romania, Craiova National College Fratii Buzesti 20
2 Gorazd Dimitrov Macedonia, Skopje Yahya Kemal College 18
3 Ivan Baksheev Russia, Novosibirsk Gymnasium 6 16
3 Artem Ismagilov Russia,
Yekaterinburg
The Specialized Educational and Scientific Center
UrFU
16
3 Bogdan Circeanu Romania, Craiova National College Fratii Buzesti 16
3 Ruxandra Icleanu Romania, Craiova Tudor Vianu National College of Computer Science 15
Diploma Sofya Gorbunova Russia,
Yekaterinburg
The Specialized Educational and Scientific Center
UrFU
13
Diploma Kirill Poltoradnev Russia,
Yekaterinburg
The Specialized Educational and Scientific Center
UrFU
13
Diploma Tudor Moga Romania, Brasov Grigore Moisil National College of Computer
Science
11
Diploma Markas Cerniauskas Lithuania, Kaunas Kaunas Technology University Gymnasium 11
Diploma Mircea-Costin Preoteasa Romania, Bucharest Tudor Vianu National College of Computer Science 11
Diploma Kirill Tugolukov Russia, Ulan-Ude School 19, Olympiad training center ENTER 11
Table 6: Winners of the first round, section B (in the category “University Student”)
Place Name Country, City University Scores
1 Maxim Plushkin Russia, Moscow Lomonosov Moscow State University 25
2 Robert Koprinkov Netherlands, Nijmegen Radboud University 20
2 Irina Slonkina Russia, Moscow National Research Nuclear University MEPhI 18
2 Marc Houben Belgium, Leuven KU Leuven 18
3 Dheeraj M Pai India, Chennai Indian Institute of Technology Madras 17
3 Alexander Grebennikov Russia, Saint Petersburg Saint Petersburg State University 16
3 Roman Lebedev Russia, Novosibirsk Novosibirsk State University 16
3 Dianthe Bose India, Chennai Chennai Mathematical Institute 15
3 Ivan Sutormin Russia, Novosibirsk Novosibirsk State University 15
Diploma Harikumar Krishnamurthy India, Chennai Indian Institute of Technology Madras 14
Diploma Roman Tarasov Russia, Odintsovo Higher School of Economics 13
Diploma Sander Suverkropp Netherlands, Wageningen Radboud University 13
Diploma Saeed Odak Iran, Tehran Khajeh Nasir Toosi University of Technology 13
Diploma Thijs van Loenhout Netherlands, Nijmegen Radboud University 12
Diploma Daniil Gurev Russia, Novosibirsk Novosibirsk State University 12
Diploma Neha Rino India, Chennai Chennai Mathematical Institute 12
Diploma Kristina Volyakova Russia, Yaroslavl Yaroslavl State University 12
Table 7: Winners of the first round, section B (in the category “Professional”)
Place Name Country, City Organization Scores
1 Alexey Udovenko Luxembourg, Luxembourg University of Luxembourg 23
3 Henning Seidler Germany, Berlin TU Berlin 16
Diploma Alexey Chilikov Russia, Moscow Bauman Moscow State Technical University 14
Diploma Samuel Tang Hong Kong, Hong Kong Blocksquare Limited 12
Diploma Amedeo Sgueglia United Kingdom, London London School of Economics and Political Science 12
Diploma Samad Alaamati Iran, Tehran American Society for Industrial Security 12
Table 8: Winners of the second round (in the category “School Student”)
Place Names Country, City School Scores
Diploma Brian Ncube Zimbabwe, Hwange Hwange High School 7
Table 9: Winners of the second round (in the category “University student”)
Place Name Country, City University Scores
1 Maxim Plushkin Russia, Moscow Lomonosov Moscow State University 43
2 Irina Slonkina Russia, Moscow National Research Nuclear University
MEPhI
38
2 Dmitry Lavrenov, Egor Lavrenov,
Uladzimir Paprotski
Belarus, Minsk Belarusian State University 37
3 Thanh Nguyen Van, Tuong Nguyen
Van, Dinh Ton
Vietnam, Ho Chi
Minh City
Ho Chi Minh City University of Technol-
ogy, University of Science
37
3 Ngoc Ky Nguyen, Phuoc Nguyen
Ho Minh, Danh Nam Tran
Vietnam, Ho Chi
Minh City; France,
Paris
Ho Chi Minh City Pedagogical University,
Ho Chi Minh City University of Technol-
ogy, Ecole Normale Superieure
34
3 Dianthe Bose, Neha Rino India, Chennai Chennai Mathematical Institute 33
3 Roman Lebedev, Vladimir Sitnov,
Alexander Tkachev
Russia, Novosibirsk Novosibirsk State University 30
3 Mikhail Sorokin, Darya Frolova,
Vladimir Bobrov
Russia, Moscow National Research Nuclear University
MEPhI
29
3 Andrey Kalachev, Danil
Cherepanov, Alexey Radaev
Russia, Moscow Bauman Moscow State Technical Univer-
sity
27
Diploma Saveliy Skresanov Russia, Novosibirsk Novosibirsk State University 21
Diploma Harikumar Krishnamurthy, Aditya
Pradeep, Dheeraj M Pai
India, Chennai Indian Institute of Technology Madras 21
Table 10: Winners of the second round (in the category “Professional”)
Place Names Country, City Organization Scores
1 Alexey Udovenko Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
University of Luxembourg 72
2 Evgeniya Ishchukova, Vyacheslav
Salmanov, Oksana Shamilyan
Russia, Taganrog Southern Federal University 46
3 Henning Seidler, Katja Stumpp Germany, Berlin Berlin Technical University 40
3 Carl Londahl Sweden, Karlskrona TrueSec AB 38
3 Alexey Chilikov Russia, Moscow Bauman Moscow State Technical University 38
Diploma Duc Tri Nguyen, Quan Doan,
Quoc Bao Nguyen
Vietnam,
Ho Chi Minh city
CERG at George Mason University,
E-CQURITY, Ho Chi Minh City University
of Technology
37
Diploma Radu Caragea, Miruna Rosca,
Madalina Bolboceanu
Romania,
Bucharest
Bitdefender 32
Diploma Mikhail Polyakov, Mikhail
Tsvetkov, Victoria Vlasova
Russia, Moscow Bauman Moscow State Technical
University
30
Diploma Harry Lee, Samuel Tang Hong Kong,
Hong Kong
Blocksquare Limited, Hong Kong University
of Science and Technology
29
Diploma Lars Haulin Sweden, Uppsala – 28
Diploma Sergey Titov, Kristina Geut Russia,
Yekaterinburg
Ural State University of Railway
Transport
22
Diploma Khai Hanh Tang, Neng Zeng,
Thu Hien Chu Thi
Singapore,
Singapore
Ho Chi Minh City Pedagogical University,
Nanyang Technological University
21
References
[1] Agievich S., Gorodilova A., Idrisova V., Kolomeec N., Shushuev G., Tokareva N. Mathematical
problems of the second international student’s Olympiad in cryptography // Cryptologia. 2017.
V. 41. No. 6. P. 534–565.
[2] Agievich S., Gorodilova A., Kolomeec N., Nikova S., Preneel B., Rijmen V., Shushuev G.,
Tokareva N., Vitkup V. Problems, solutions and experience of the first international student’s
Olympiad in cryptography // Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika (Applied Discrete Mathe-
matics). 2015. No. 3. P. 41–62.
[3] Agievich S., Marchuk V., Maslau A., Semenov V. Bash-f: another LRX sponge function //
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/587.
[4] Bhasin S., Carlet C., Guilley S. Theory of masking with codewords in hardware: low-weight dth-
order correlation-immune Boolean functions // Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/303.
[5] Bierbrauer J. Bounds on orthogonal arrays and resilient functions // Journal of Combinatorial
Designs. 1995. V. 3. P. 179–183.
[6] Friedman J. On the bit extraction problem // Proc. 33rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science. 1992. P. 314–319.
[7] Geut K., Kirienko K., Sadkov P., Taskin R., Titov S. On explicit constructions for solving the
problem “A secret sharing” // Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika. Prilozhenie. 2017. No. 10.
P. 68–70. (in Russian)
[8] Gorodilova A., Agievich S., Carlet C., Gorkunov E., Idrisova V., Kolomeec N., Kutsenko A.,
Nikova S., Oblaukhov A., Picek S., Preneel B., Rijmen V., Tokareva N. Problems and solutions of
the Fourth International Students Olympiad in Cryptography (NSUCRYPTO) // Cryptologia.
2019, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 138–174.
[9] Oblaukhov A. A lower bound on the size of the largest metrically regular subset of the Boolean
cube // Cryptography and Communications. 2018. Published online.
[10] Picek S., Guilley S., Carlet C., Jakobovic D., Miller J. F. Evolutionary Approach for Finding
Correlation Immune Boolean Functions of Order t with Minimal Hamming Weight. In: Dediu
AH., Magdalena L., Martn-Vide C. (eds) Theory and Practice of Natural Computing. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 9477. Springer, Cham.
[11] Tokareva N., Gorodilova A., Agievich S., Idrisova V., Kolomeec N., Kutsenko A.,
Oblaukhov A., Shushuev G. Mathematical methods in solutions of the problems from the Third
International Students’ Olympiad in Cryptography // Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika
(Applied Discrete Mathematics). 2018. No. 40. P. 34–58.
[12] Shangguan C., Ge G. New bounds on the number of tests for disjunct matrices // IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory. 2016, vol. 62, no. 12, pp. 7518–7521.
[13] http://www.isthe.com/chongo/tech/comp/fnv/
[14] https://gist.githubusercontent.com/StevenClontz/4445774/raw/
1722a289b665d940495645a5eaaad4da8e3ad4c7/mobydick.txt
[15] https://nsucrypto.nsu.ru/olymp/2018/round/2/task/4
24
